



Death taxes are not new. Some form of taxation at death or impost
was levied by the early Egyptians in the Seventh Century Before Christ
and has been perpetuated by the Romans, the nations of Europe, and the
United States.1 With the exception of Nevada, all the states of the
United States have death tax legislation.
2
The term "death taxes" is a general term. It may include either
"inheritance" tax, "succession" tax, "estate" tax, or "transfer" tax. The
incidence of tax in the inheritance tax is imposed on the privilege of
receiving, whereas the incidence of the estate tax falls on the decedent's
estate.' The death tax is not a property tax, but an excise tax,4 and re-
lates to the transmission of the property from the dead to the living.
This right to transmit property is not a natural right but is one created by
statute.5 Thus the sovereign states may impose various restrictions or
limitations on the right to receive or transmit property.
Suppose for a moment that a resident of state A dies in state B and
includible in his estate are real property located in states A, B and C,
tangible personal property located in. states A, B and D, and intangible
personal property located in states A, B, E, F and G. Assuming all these
states have some form of death tax, which one will have "jurisdiction"
to tax? State A may claim that the decedent was domiciled in A and
therefore "we have jurisdiction to levy a death tax"; state B may like-
wise claim jurisdiction by means of domicile; state C may claim, "we
have afforded protection and rights to the realty located in our state,"
and thereby claims jurisdiction to levy a death tax; states D, E, F and G
may claim jurisdiction to tax on the basis of "physical situs" or "business
situs" within their respective states, and on that basis attempt to levy a
death tax.
Is it possible for all these states to tax the particular property in de-
cedent's estate, or will the incidents of tax be restricted to one state? If
all the states may establish a sufficient nexus to levy a death tax, is there
any possible solution that will limit or reduce the tax burden on decedent's
estate?
The purpose of this paper is to digest the basic conflicts of juris-
diction to levy a death tax based on domicile and situs, to interpret the
failure of the courts to reconcile these conflicts and to analyze the possi-
IIn re Inman's Estate, 101 Ore. 182, 199 Pac. 615 (1921).
2 CCH, INH. EST. AND GIFT TAX REP. f1100.
3 See BowE, TAX PLANNING FOR ESTATES (1955).
4 Keeny v. New York, 222 U.S. 525 (1911). It may be made a property tax
by state constitution; 9 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 65 (1954).
5 U.S. v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, 627 (1896).
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ble solutions to the dilemma emphasizing the reciprocal agreements be-
tween the states.
INTERSTATE CONFLICTS AND LIMITATIONS-
DOUBLE DOMICILE? DOUBLE Srrus?
That a state must have jurisdiction of the subject matter in order to
tax is elementary law. The basic conflict arises over the question of what
indicia will constitute jurisdiction. "Domicile" 6 and "situs"' are, sub-
stantially, the foremost indicia a state will seek in order to impose a
death tax.8
Whether or not a decedent is a resident or domiciliary9 of a certain
state is a question of fact."0 Existing domicile, whether of origin or by
selection, continues until a new one is acquired." Two factors must be
present to effectuate a change of domicile: (1) intention to acquire a
new domicile and (2) actual change of residence.' 2 Some factors that
a court may use in determining a decedent's domicile are actual residence,
church affiliations, club membership, deeds, actual time of residence,
principal place of business, or place where decedent worked.'" As a
result, two states might claim that a decedent was domiciled in their
respective states at the same time; consequently each state might claim
jurisdiction to tax.' 4 This notion might produce harsh death tax con-
sequences. As a matter of fact, it could reduce the assets of an estate to
a negligible size if enough states should levy their death taxes.
The other basis for a state to claim jurisdiction sufficient to authorize
the levy of a death tax is situs. Hence we denote an interplay between
6The word "domicile" comes from the Latin word domus meaning home or
dwelling. Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 478, 149 So. 483, 487 (1933).
7 Latin meaning situation or location. Heston v. Finley, 118 Kan. 717, 236
Pac. 841 (1925).
8This statement is based upon a synopsis of many articles and cases.
9 Domicile and residence are used interchangeably. CCH, INH. EST. AND GIFr
TAX REP. f1f425.
10 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §15.2 (1935).
11 Feehan v. Trefry, 237 Mass. 169, 129 N.E. 292 (1921).
12 Hufman v. Lacksinger, 190 Wis. 97, 208 N.W. 913 (1926); In re Moir's
Estate, 207 Ill. 180, 69 N.E. 905 (1904); A, living in Washington City, voting in
Ohio and intending to return to Ohio, was held to be domiciled in Ohio. Hill v.
Blumenberg, 19 Ohio App. 404 (1924) ; see also Est. of E. Dorrance, 309 Pa. 151,
163 Atl. 303 (1932) and 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 AtI. 601 (1934) ; BEALE, op. cit. supra
note 10.
13 For a discussion of these factors, see CCH, INtc. EST. AND GIFT TAX REP.
ff1425; see also 3 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 65 (1954).
14 Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939); Est. of G. E. Hartman, 70 N. J.
Eq. 664, 62 At. 560 (1906). "[A] man . . . can have only one [domicile] for the
purpose of succession .... [T]he absurdity would be monstrous, if it were possible,
that there should be a competition between two domiciles as to the distribution of
the personal estate." Somerville v. Lord Somerville, 5 Ves. 750, 31 Eng. Repr. 31
(Ch. 1801).
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the words situs and domicile in certain circumstances. An important
distinction must be made at this time." Whether a state will be able to
conclude that it has a sufficient contact with the subject matter to be
taxed will turn on the type of property in the decedent's estate-real
estate, tangible personalty or intangible personalty. The situs of real
estate, without further complications of fact, is the state in which it is
located. 5 The situs of tangible property generally is in the state of
physical location, and this may be a state other than where decedent was
domiciled."8 Intangible persona] property might have a "fictional" situs
in the domicile of the decedent as well as an "actual" situs in the state
where it is found. In determining whether intangible personalty may be
taxed in a state of actual situs other than the decedent's domicile, the
courts will consider whether or not the transfer of such intangibles was
protected by the direct contact with the laws of that state. The term
"business situs" is used in describing the contact that intangibles have
with the taxing state. Thus where the intangible personalty is found to
have acquired a business situs in a certain state, that state may levy its
tax. Some of the elements which the courts may consider in determining
business situs are: (1) physical presence of property in the taxing state;
(2) property employed in carrying on business in the taxing state; (3)
resident agent in the taxing state; (4) debtor residing in the taxing state;
and (5) trust located and administered in the taxing state.'
The problems facing the courts in this area are of no small im-
portance. To assist in analyzing the problem of interstate conflicts and
limitations of jurisdiction in the area of death taxes, it will be helpful
to divide the discussion into two separate categories. First, where a de-
cedent's estate is subject to a tax being levied by a non-domiciliary state.
Second, where the domicile of the decedent is not in question, but the
estate is subject to a tax being levied on a non-domiciliary state.
Domiciliary-Resident State: Vexation of Double Domicile
Returning to the problem of the decedent domiciled in state A with
real property located in States A and B includible in his estate, it seems
clear that state A may levy a death tax upon the transfer of the real
estate located in state A, while state B may not levy a tax on that
property.' 8 Similarly, state B may not tax the devolution of realty out-
side its jurisdiction. However, if the real estate interest of-the decedent
is in the form of a mortgage, shares of stock of a real estate trust or a
similar type of property interest, some courts may have trouble in de-
ciding first whether the interest is realty or personalty and if personalty,
15 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 204 (1905).
16 Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1924).
17For an excellent analysis of business situs, see LAND, TRUSTs IN THE
CONFLICT OF LAws, §50.2 (1940).
18 Louisville and Jeffersonville Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903); Union
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra note 15.
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whether it is within their taxing jurisdiction.' 9 Thus a Maine court,
following the rule of lex rei sitae, held that a realty trust composed
solely of real estate was real property and not personal property; there-
fore only the state of actual situs was authorized to tax, irrespective of
decedent's domiciliary state.2" Where real estate was sold and the pro-
ceeds were distributed pursuant to instructions in a will, it was held that
the interests of those beneficiaries who died before the real estate was
sold was intangible personal property, not real property.2 Although
decedent's real estate may be outside the domiciliary jurisdiction, state A
may nevertheless be able to derive some revenue by taxing the transfer.
22
1. Tangible Personal Property
The development of the death tax in the area of tangible personal
property has been more complex than that of real property. Continuing
with the hypothetical problem where the decedent domiciled in state A
has tangibles located in States A and D, we again ask, "Which of these
states may tax?" In 1925 the United States Supreme Court handed
down the famous decision of Frick v. Pennsylvania,2 relating to the
taxable jurisdiction of tangibles. In that case, the Supreme Court held
that a domiciliary state did not have sufficient jurisdiction to exact an
inheritance tax on the transfer of tangible personalty situated in another
state. The court compared the tangible personal property to "immovable
realty" and gave to the Frick Art Collection a single .situs. Before this
decision, the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam had been followed and
thereby a domiciliary state could tax the tangible personalty located in
another state. It was thought that the situs of tangibles followed the
domicile of their owner. However, those state decisions were not strictly
confined to tangibles like a ring or a car. But it now seems to be
thought that the situs of tangibles may become detached from that of
their owner.
When a state reaches beyond its borders and fastens upon
tangible property, it confers nothing in return for its exaction.
Since the state of location has all but complete dominion over
the physical objects sought to be measured for tax ... no other
state can offer quid pro quod.2 '
19 CCH, INH., EST. AND Girr TAX REP. 190,408 (North Carolina Attorney
General opinion holding an oil lease on property in state B to be realty and out-
side state A's taxing jurisdiction); see also 1921 Ohio Op. Atty. Gen. 209.
2 0 Bates v. Judge of Probate, 131 Me. 176, 160 Atl. 22 (1932). But where
corpus of trust contained both realty and personalty, the court considered property
as intangible, and held that the domiciliary state may tax. In re Stephenson's
Estate, 171 Wis. 452, 177 N.W. 579 (1920).
21 Haas v. Holman, 143 Ore. 141, 21 P. 2d 795 (1933); but see Matter of
Estate of Swift, 137 N.Y. 77, 32 N.E. 1096 (1893).
22 See further discussion under INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY, infra.
23268 U.S. 473 (1924).
24Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251, 256 (1949), citing Frick v. Penn-
sylvania, supra, note 23.
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The Frick decision then stands for the proposition that only the state
where tangible personal property is permanently kept is the proper taxable
situs of that property, thus denouncing the maxim of mobilia sequuntur
personam in the area of tangibles. Before this notable decision, estates
here had been burdened with double taxation-the state of domicile and
the state of actual situs both levying a death tax.
A problem arises in applying the Frick doctrine where two states
disagree as to whether certain property is classified as tangible or intangi-
ble. In Blodgett v. Silberman,"5 Connecticut; the domiciliary state,
claimed that cash in a safe deposit box in New York was intangible
property and thus taxable by Connecticut by applying the mobilia maxim;
New York, on the other hand, insisted the property was tangible. The
Supreme Court ruled in favor of New York by applying the Frick
doctrine.
Whether or not the tangible personalty is permanently located in
the taxing state is another element in determining situs. If the property
were loaned for a short time or if it were transitory, one would expect
the domiciliary state to retain the taxing authority to the exclusion of a
"physical situs" state. 26
Briefly, the determination of whether State A or State D may exact
a death tax is limited to the location or situs of the tangibles. One state
may tax; two states may not tax. However, double domicile remains a
concealed threat to the notion of single taxation.
2. Intangible Personal Property
Jurisdiction to impose death taxes with respect to intangible per-
sonalty "has been the subject of protracted and violent controversy".2 7
At this juncture, domicile and situs become heterogeneous and a new
path emerges-multiple taxation. Since this subdivision is quite complex
and involved, part of the topic will be discussed under the heading
Non-domicillary-Non-resident State. With an effort to focus the dis-
cussion on the decedent resident of State A with intangibles located in
various states, the impact of the mobilia sequuntur personam doctrine
discussed in connection with the Frick and Blodgett doctrines will be
analyzed.
Those cases held that State A, the domicile of the decedent, may
include intangibles with a "physical" or "business" situs in States D, E,
F' and G in the taxable estate of our imaginary decedent. About 1930 a
series of cases began holding that intangibles were taxable only by the
state of domicile. Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota8 set the
25 2 88 U.S. 1 (1927).
26 City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 293 U.S. 112 (1934) ; Frick v.
Pennsylvania, supra, note 23; Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, supra,
note 15; LAND, TRUST IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1940).
2 7 MAGILL AND MAGUIRE, CASES ON TAXATION, 540 (4th ed. 1947).
28 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
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pace by indicating that double taxation should be stopped. In the same
year, Baldwin v. Missour?9 restricted the taxing power over notes and
bonds to the domicile of the creditor which was considered to be the
situs of the debts. The effect of these decisions was to overrule many
previous decisions which had allowed double taxation.3" Then in 1932,
the United States Supreme Court in First National Bank of Boston v.
Maine,3 held that shares of stock of a domestic corporation owned by
a nonresident were not taxable by the state of incorporation, but only by
the state of decedent's domicile. The court reserved comment on possi-
ble "business situs" saying, "we do not overlook the possibility that shares
of stock, as well as other intangibles, may be so used in a state other than
that of the owner's domicile as to give them a situs analogous to the
actual situs of tangible personal property."
Further analysis of this problem will be dealt with later, but it seems
clear by these holdings that State A, if it holds itself to be the domicile of
the decedent, has jurisdiction to levy a death tax on the intangibles in the
decedent's estate notwithstanding their situs in another jurisdiction. Then,
if State B holds itself also to be a domiciliary state, it could also levy a
death tax.
One famous case that seems to be appropriate to mention in con-
clusion is Estate of E. Dorrance3 Dr. Dorrance, whose total estate was
approximately $115,000,000, was considered by the Pennsylvania Courts
to be a resident of Pennsylvania. His estate was assessed an inheritance
tax of approximately $17,000,000. New Jersey thought Dr. Dorrance
was a resident of their state also, and levied their death tax of approxi-
mately $15,000,000. Five times this case was appealed to the United
States Supreme Court and five times the Court refused to take jurisdiction
of the case. The estate consisted chiefly of intangible personal property;
thus the principles and rules heretofore pronounced would pull into each
state substantially the entire estate for purposes of death taxation. Of
course, if realty or tangibles had been considered, domicile alone would
not be sufficient to empower a state to levy death taxes on the decedent's
whole estate.
It doesn't take much imagination to see how an estate could be
reduced to a negligible amount by adherence to the Dorrance case. The
various suggestions offered to alleviate this multiple tax burden will be
interpreted later in this paper.33
Nondomiciliary-Nonresident State: Vexation of Double Situs
Turning to the incidence of tax that attaches to a state claiming
29281 U.S. 586 (1930).
30Kidder cites 33 cases holding physical presence in a taxing state to be
sufficient nexus for levying an inheritance tax regardless of decedent's domicile.
KIDDER, STATE INHERITANCE TAX AND TAXABILITY OF TRUSTS (i934).
31284 U.S. 312 (1932).
32 309 Pa. 151, 163 At]. 303 (1932) and 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 At!. 601 (1934).
33 See SOLUTIONS OTHER THAN RECIPROCITY, in fra.
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jurisdiction based on situs, it will now be assumed that the domicile of the
decedent is fixed in one state.
Resuming the reference in our hypothetical fact situation where A
is the domiciliary state and B is the nondomiciliary state, could State B
levy a death tax upon the succession to real estate located in State A?
Much of what was said previously under Domicilfiary State relative to
real estate will apply to this discussion. In Matter of Estate of S'wift,
3 4
the New York court rejected the argument posed by counsel advocating
the acceptance by the court of the equitable conversion doctrine. In that
case, "neither the doctrine of equitable conversion of bonds, nor any
fiction of situs of movables can have any bearing upon the question under
advisement.""S Some states have adopted this view while others have re-
jected it. 6 This could easily lead to an estate being taxed by two dif-
ferent states. If State B, where the land lies, rejects the argument, it
will claim that the real estate is still within its jurisdiction and levy a
tax. At the same time, State A, the domiciliary state, by accepting the
doctrine, will base a claim on the mobilia maxim governing intangibles
and levy a tax. In a recent Maryland Attorney General Opinion, it was
held that real estate in Maryland which was directed to be sold by the
will of a nonresident decedent was not, under the theory of equitable
conversion, relieved from the Maryland Inheritance Tax.37 Again we
note that if realty is the subject matter in question, only the state wherein
the realty lies may levy the death tax upon that part of the estate; but
if the equitable conversion doctrine is considered, a conflict of jurisdiction
to tax may arise.
1. Tangible Personal Property
Where the decedent domiciled in State A dies owning tangible
personalty in State B, the emphasis is placed on whether or not State B
may levy a death tax based on the "physical situs" of the property. It was
concluded earlier that State A was not the proper state of jurisdiction to
tax, but is State B the proper taxable jurisdiction? In City Bank Farmers
Trust Co. v. Schnader,38 where the facts were the converse of the Frick
case, the Supreme Court adhered to the rule that the situs of tangibles
may become divorced from the domicile of the owner thereof and be
taxed solely by the state of "physical situs." Like the Frick case, the
Schnader case was concerned with an art collection. But in the latter
case the collection was claimed to be subject to a death tax by the state
of situs, while in the former case the collection was alleged to be taxable
by state of domicile. Both cases resolved the conflicts in favor of the
state of situs. Vhether or not the state attempting to levy the tax is the
34 137 N.Y. 77, 32 N.E. 1096 (1893).
35 Ibid.
34 CCH, INH. EST. AND GiFT TAX REP. 1605 A.
37 CCH, INH. EST. AND GIFr TAX REP. 18,472.
38 293 U.S. 112 (1934).
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state of situs will depend upon whether the tangible personalty is perma-
nently or temporarily located in a certain jurisdiction.39
Thus a general rule evolves with respect to tangibles: regardless of
decedents domicile, if the tangible personalty within his estate acquires a
physical situs in a given state, that state and only that state may levy a
death tax on that property.
2. Intangible Personal Property
The most controversial area involves the taxability of intangible
personalty by a nonresident state. This problem is represented by the
assumption previously presented where a domiciliary decedent of State A
owns intangibles located in States E, F and G. We have seen that
State A could include all of the intangibles in the decedents estate for
the purpose of measuring its death tax. Could States E, F and G also
levy a death tax on those intangibles located within their respective
jurisdictions?
Some background would be helpful in understanding the difficulty
presented by this hypothetical situation. In 1903 the United States
Supreme Court, through its decision in Blackstone v. Miller,4" held that
New York could impose a death tax on bank deposits located in that state
and owned by a domiciliary of Illinois. Here the Court squarely faced
this issue of double taxation. Mr. Justice Holmes said: "No doubt this
power on the part of two states to tax on different and more or less
inconsistent principles leads to some hardships ... but these inconsistencies
infringe no rule of constitutional law." He did not believe that it was
the duty of the Supreme Court to alleviate all economic hardships created
by the states. This overlapping of two heterogeneous bases for juris-
diction to tax, domicile and situs, caused double taxation until 1930, when
Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota4 overruled the Blackstone
case. During this period it was thought that double taxation of intangibles
was unconstitutional and that the only proper taxing jurisdiction was the
domiciliary state.4" In Baldwin v. Missouri43 an Illinois resident had
cash deposits, bonds and notes in Missouri. The notes were secured by
land located in Missouri. Missouri attempted to exact an inheritance tax
on these intangibles, but the court held that Missouri did not have a
sufficient nexus to tax based on business situs. Mr. Justice Stone dissented
on the ground that there was a sufficient basis to permit Missouri to levy
a tax. He mentioned that it afforded protection to the securities, that
there was necessary resort to Missouri's laws and that there was no proof
that the securities had no business situs in that state.
39 Supra note 26. Coins and bank notes in a safe deposit box might even be
treated as tangibles, thereby invoking the Frick rule. Blodgett v. Silberman, supra
note 25.
40 188 U.S. 189 (1903).
41 Supra, note 28.
42 See LAND, op. cit. supra, note 26.
4 3 Supra, note 29.
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Then the state courts began to give a different twist to "business
situs." Some began to hold that where a trust was administered and
located in State E, that state acquired the situs and could tax the succes-
sion, whereas the domiciliary state could not tax.44
In 1939 the Curry45 and Graves4" decisions, which reinstated the
"pre-1930" rule were handed down, and once again double taxation of
intangibles was allowed. In these cases, the settlor of a trust was domi-
ciled in State A and the trust res was located and administered in State E.
Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for the Court in the Curry case, stated:
But when the taxpayer extends his activities with respect to his
intangibles, so as to avail himself of the protection and benefit
of the laws of another state, in such a way as to bring his person
or property within the reach of the tax gatherer there, the
reason for a single place of taxation no longer obtains, and the
rule (mobilia sequuntur personam) is not even a workable
substitute for the reasons which may exist in any particular case
to support the constitutional power of each state concerned to
tax. . . It is undeniable that the state of domicile is not de-
prived, by the taxpayer's activities elsewhere, of its con-
stitutional jurisdiction to tax and consequently that there are
many circumstances in which more than one state may have
jurisdiction to impose a tax and measure it by some or all of
taxpayer's intangibles.4T
This view seems to be midway between the two earlier doctrines in that
the nondomiciliary state must establish some type of business situs in order
to tax.
Referring again to the hypothetical problem, State A could clearly
tax; State E, if it is the place where securities are kept, where the trust is
administered, or where business is conducted, could tax; 41 State F, the
domicile of that trustee, could tax. 49 The domicile of the beneficiaries in
either State E or F might sway an undetermined court.
In 1942, Graves v. Schmidlap 5 ° held that the state (A) of domi-
cile of the donor of a power of appointment may tax as well as the
state (C) of domicile of the donee. The intangible property was located
in State A. Before this decision, state courts as well as the United States
Supreme Court had held that where a trust was created and administered
in State G in favor of a life beneficiary (resident of State A) who ex-
44 MaeClurkan v. Bugbee, 106 N.J.L. 192, 150 Atd. 443 (1930).
45 Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
4 6 Graves v. Elliot, 307 U.S. 385 (1939).
4 7 Supra, note 45.
48 Curry v. MeCanless, supra note 45; Graves v. Elliot, supra note 46. See
also New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U.S. 309 (1899).
49 67 A.L.R. 393 (1930).
50 315 U.S. 657 (1942).
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ercised a power of appointment upon death, State A could not impose a
succession tax upon the transfer."
One further loophole the Supreme Court dosed was the right of a
nondomiciliary state (H) to tax stock of a corporation incorporated under
the laws of that state. If the situs of a share of stock is in the state of
incorporation, the Frick decision would permit the nondomiciliary-situs
state to tax. If the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam applies the state
of decedent's domicile (A) could tax. State Tax Comm. of Utah v.
Aldrch2 held that both State A and State H could tax. Mr. Justice
Jackson had this to say:
Weighing the highly doctrinaire reasons advanced for this
decision against its practical effects on our economy and upon
our whole constitutional law of state taxation, I can see
nothing in the court's decision more useful than the proverbial
leap from the frying pan into the fire. 3
As mentioned earlier, this area of taxation presents many conflicts of
opinion concerning this resulting double taxation based on double situs.
A "fictional" situs is created in the domiciliary state and an actual or
business situs is allowed to remain in another state. Under the Curry and
Graves doctrines multiple taxation is permissible. The Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States is no argument against it;
the benefit and protection theory seemed to be firmly imbedded in our
law and was even extended in Greenough v. Tax Issessors.54 A resident
of New York created a testamentary trust of intangibles located in
New York. One of the trustees was a resident of New York while the
other trustee was a resident of Rhode Island, which state levied a per-
sonal property tax on one half the value of the corpus. The General
Laws of Rhode Island, c. 30, §9 (1938), provided in part as follows:
Intangible personal property held in trust . . .shall be taxed
to such . . . trustee . . . in the town where the .. . trustee
resides; and if there be more than one such ... trustee, then
in equal proportions to each of such ... trustees in the towns
where they respectively resided.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the tax by saying the tax did
not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
state of the trustee's residence affords him protection as the owner of
intangibles; he can sue and be sued therein; he has the benefit and pro-
tection inherent in the Rhode Island government. "[T] he resident trus-
tee was the possessor of an interest in the intangibles . . . sufficient to
1 Wachovia Trust Co. v. Daughton, 272 U.S. 567 (1926); McMurty v.
State, 111 Conn. 594, 151 Atl. 252 (1930) ; Walker v. Treasurer and Receiver
General, 221 Mass, 600, 109 N.E. 647 (1915).
52 316 U.S. 174 (1942); see also dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in
First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932).
53 316 U.S. at 195.
54 331 U.S. 486 (1946).
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support a proportional tax for the benefit and protection afforded to that
interest by Rhode Island." The Court stated that it was not considering
the "expedience of the levy" nor "its economic effect on the economy of
the taxing state," but that its only question to be resolved was "whether or
not a provision of the Constitution forbids this tax."
In conclusion, it seems as though there is no constitutional impedi-
ment to the multiple taxation of intangibles where a nonresident state
can show the property wasat least partially protected by the direct contact
with the laws of that state. To limit taxation of intangibles to the state
of business situs might be strongly recommended, and then approach
intangibles as we did tangibles in the Frick case.55
Further examples of, this problem would merely be repetitions, but
what has been said clearly shows the two problems the states must con-
sider in deciding which of many states could tax or should tax the devolu-
tion of property upon death. 6 Many of the states have handled the
problems by various systems; authors of articles have offered solutions to
cope with the problem. In the succeeding portions of this paper, these
proposals and existing remedies will be taken up in accordance with the
manner in which they remedy the tax burden imposed by double domicile
and double situs.
RECIPROCITY
Reciprocal agreement statutes, dating back to 1907 when states
wanted to lessen the burden of multiple taxation of intangibles, were
given some attention after the Curry and Graves decisions.57 The effect
of such agreements is: "We will not tax the intangibles transferred from
resident decedents of your state, if you will refrain from taxing the
intangibles passing from residents of our state." Since intangibles not
only seem to be the main constituents of estates, but also the source of
the problem concerning domicile and situs, the emphasis of reciprocity
agreements is on intangibles.5 8
In 1910 the National Tax Association drafted a model inheritance
tax provision which would limit the taxation of intangibles to the domi-
ciliary state.
The tax imposed by this act in respect of personal property
55 See Buck v. Beach, 206 U.S. 392 (1907) ; also see Harrow, Conflict of
Laws in Decedent's Estates, 20 A.B.A.J. 116 (1934).
56 For an excellent discussion of the evolution of the multiple state tax
doctrine, see Brown, Multiple Death Taxation of Intangibles-What Now?, 75
T uSTS AND ESTATES 269 (1942); see also 1 VANDERBILT L. Rar. (1947); LAND,
op. cit. supra note 26.
57 For the historical setting behind reciprocal status, see 8 SPECIAL REPORT
OF THE STATE TAX COMMISSioN, N.Y. 28 (1935) ; see also Brady, Death Taxes-
Developments and Reciprocity, 15 A.B.A.J. 465 (1929).




(except tangible personal property having an actual situs in this
state) shall not be payable
(a) if the transferor at the time of his death was a
resident of a state which at the time of his death
did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any
character in respect of property of a resident of this
state (except tangible personal property having an
actual situs in such state) . . . or
(b) if the laws of the state . . . of residence of the
transferor at the time of his death contained a re-
ciprocal exemption provision under which non-
residents were exempted from transfer taxes or death
taxes of every character in respect to personal prop-
erty (except tangible personal property having an
actual situs therein), provided the state . . . of
residence of such nonresidents allowed similar ex-
emption to residents of the state . . . of residence of
such transferor....
For purposes of this section, intangible personal property means
incorporal property, including money, deposits in banks, mort-
gages, debts, receivables, [etc.].""
Many states have adopted some sort of plan to mitigate the harshness
of the Curry and Graves decisions. One group of states has decided not
to tax intangibles of nonresidents under any circumstances; but another
group permits taxation of intangibles of nonresidents whenever they have
jurisdiction over the property; the remaining jurisdictions have adopted,
either in toto or with some modification, the Model Inheritance Tax
Law.
6 0
Those states that have adopted in toto the inheritance tax law as
drafted by the Committee on a Model Inheritance Tax Law exempt
intangibles of a nonresident decedent domiciled in a state which exempts
intangibles either by reciprocity or by not bring them within the scope
of its statute. Absence of a taxing act also invokes the exemption. The
states that have adopted only paragraph (b) of the suggested plan seem
to indicate an intention to extend reciprocity only to those states exempting
intangibles by way of reciprocity. Ohio seems to fall under this latter
category.8 ' The Department of Taxation in Ohio, in a ruling dated
July 7, 1939, made the following comment on the Ohio Reciprocal
Statute:
Under the reciprocal exemption provided by Ohio Rev. Code
§5731.10, et. seq. shall not be construed as imposed upon suc-
cessions passing from a decedent resident of any other state...
with respect to personal property, except tangible personal
59 1910 PRoc. NATL. TAX ASsN. 279-89.
60 For the state by state breakdown of reciprocal provisions see CCH,
INn. EsT. AND GirT TAx REP. 12,080.
61 Orto REV. CODE §5731.10 (1953).
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property having actual situs in the state, to the extent to which
successions passing from a decedent resident of any other state
• . . with respect to personal property, except tangible personal
property having actual situs in the state, to the extent to which
successions passing from decedents, resident of this state, are
exempt from inheritance, estate or death taxes by such other
state....
Thus Ohio will exempt intangibles located in Ohio owned by a non-
resident decedent, providing the domiciliary state affords like exemption;
but if the domiciliary state is one which completely exempts the transfer
from a death tax, Ohio would probably tax the transfer. About 1930
Ohio had reciprocity agreements with 36 states, territories, and countries.
62
In applying these reciprocal exemption statutes, one of the first in-
quiries is whether or not the nonresident state has jurisdiction to levy a
tax. It was shown earlier in this paper how a state may acquire that
jurisdiction of intangible personalty. Assuming the state has proper au-
thority to levy a death tax, the next inquiry is whether the reciprocal
exemption statute actually comes into play.
Assume that a decedent domiciled in Massachusetts dies leaving in-
tangibles located in Iowa. The Iowa statute63 requires as a condition
precedent to the application of the statute that the intangibles be taxed in
the state of domicile. If Massachusetts levied an inheritance tax based on
domicile, it seems that Iowa would exempt those intangibles from being
taxed. If Massachusetts did not tax the transfer, Iowa could levy its
death tax. Suppose that decedent's intangibles had a taxable situs in a
reciprocating state, Michigan, 64 which adopted the model statute pro-
posed by the National Tax Association. If Massachusetts law imposes no
transfer tax or death tax of any. character in respect of property of
Massachusetts' domiciliaries, the intangibles would then be exempt from
taxation in the non-resident state, Michigan. If the intangible personalty
were situated in one of the states that has no provision for reciprocity and
taxes the transfer of a nonresident in the non-domiciliary state6  and
Massachusetts levied an inheritance tax based on domicile, it is more
probable than not that the intangible will be taxed by both the domiciliary
state and the non-domiciliary state. If this be so, it appears that we are
right back where we started with double taxation.
Decedent, resident of a state whose reciprocity laws are the same as
the reciprocity laws of the nonresident state, 6 dies leaving intangibles in
his estate. Either double taxation or a stalemate could result, unless the
02 See CASSIDY AND DARGUSCH, THE LAWS OF ESTATE AND INHERITANCE
TAXATION (1930).
6 3 IOWA CODE ANN. §450.91 (1949).
6 4 MICH. STAT. ANN. §§7.561, 7.561(1), and 7.579 (1950).
65 For example Mississippi; MIss. CODE ANN. §9262-32 (Supp. 1956).
66 Each state exempts "from transfer taxes or death taxes of every char-
acter in respect to [intangibles]" provided the other state grants an exemption.
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states' administrators worked out a compromise. The problem could be
amplified by inquiry into what constitutes "like" or "similar" property to
be exempted in those states that so provide. If the reciprocity laws of a
domiciliary state provided for exemption conditioned upon the non-
domiciliary state's providing for "like" or "similar" exemption and if the
non-domiciliary state's reciprocity laws were substantially the same, the
resulting issue of "like" exemption could become involved. The domi-
ciliary state might levy a tax based on the fictional situs principle and the
non-domiciliary state, deciding that the domiciliary state would not afford
like exemption, might levy a tax based on business situs.
A similar conflict could arise where the two competing states cannot
agree as to whether certain properties are tangibles or intangibles. It will
be noted that the Model Inheritance Tax Law specifically excludes from
its scope "tangible personal property having an actual situs in this state."
Most of the reciprocal statutes of the states incorporate the same language.
But if two reciprocating states are not in accord as to what tangibles or
intangibles will encompass, the reciprocal laws may have a retaliatory
effect. "The failure to define tangibles and intangibles may lead to
trouble. What may be tangible in one state may be intangible in
another ... "67
For further illustration of an instance where reciprocal laws may
not fully provide relief from double taxation might be created, suppose
State A's death tax laws do not impose a tax on estates less than $100,000,
whereas State B begins estates at $25,000. If a resident of State A
should die leaving $100,000 of intangible personalty in State B, of course
State A would not impose a tax on this first $100,000. But the reciprocity
problem is whether or not State B will impose a death tax on the differ-
ence between $100,000 and $25,000. If State B has a reciprocal agree-
ment with State A whereby State B will not tax intangibles of a resident
of State A, if a "like exemption" was allowed by the laws of State A,
State B might proceed to impose a death tax on the $75,000, providing
reciprocity to the extent of the $25,000. If State B's laws were similar
to the Wisconsin reciprocal statute "provided that this section shall not
apply unless a tax is imposed on the transfer of said property by the laws
of the state . . .of residence," State B may decide that its reciprocity
laws do not apply. The result could be an exemption of $100,000 by
State A, but a full tax on the $75,000 by State B. If the amount of
intangibles in the state were $200,000 instead of $100,000, double taxa-
tion is likely to result. Based on the foregoing discussion, State B might
contend that it would grant exemption up to $25,000, but tax all excess
amounts because State A does not grant a "like exemption." State A will,
of course, tax any amount exceeding the first $100,000. An estate could
escape a death tax altogether by a certain combination of states. If de-
6 7 Brady, Death Taxes-Flat Rates and Reciprocity, 14 A.B.A.J. 309, 312
(1928).
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cedent were a resident of Nevada, a state which has no death law, and
died leaving intangible personalty in a state that has adopted the proposed
Inheritance Tax Law either in toto or has adopted only paragraph (a),
no death tax would be imposed. Nevada *of course would not tax. The
nonresident state, if adopting the law in toto, would not tax because of
paragraph (a) of the reciprocal exemption law, which exempts the trans-
fer from tax if the resident state "did not impose a transfer tax or a
death tax of any character in respect of property of resident of this
state." If the nonresident state had only adopted paragraph (b), it is
possible that it would not impose a tax, but, as indicated previously, Ohio
may not provide for this exemption.
Different combinations of facts could be considered to show one
state taxing, both states taxing, or no state taxing. Nevertheless, reci-
procity has offered at least a possible solution to double taxation. In
Estate of Stewart v. State,68 a resident of the District of Columbia owned
stock in a Wisconsin corporation. The certificate of stock was kept in
the resident state. This stock was bequeathed in trust and the income
therefrom was to be used for cancer research. The nonresident state
levied an inheritance tax on this transfer as the charitable purpose was not
restricted to the District of Columbia.6" Wisconsin also tried to levy an
inheritance tax on that stock held in the Wisconsin corporation. Wisconsin
had a reciprocal exemption statute which provided as follows:
Personal property of a nonresident decedent made taxable
under this chapter (except tangibles with situs in Wisconsin)
shall not be subject to the tax so imposed if a like exemption
was allowed at the time of death of such decedent by the laws
of the state . . . of decedent's residence in favor of residents
of this state, provided that this section shall not apply unless a
tax is imposed on the transfer of said property by the laws of
the state . . . of residence. 70
Because of this reciprocal statute and because the District of Columbia
had levied a tax, it was claimed that Wisconsin should live up to her
bargain and not create double taxation. But since the District of Colum-
bia had no reciprocal exemption statute, it was claimed the Wisconsin
reciprocal statute was not applicable and therefore Wisconsin should tax.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that, although the District of
Columbia did not have a reciprocal exemption statute, it did have a
statute which fixed the situs of intangibles at the domicile of the owner;
71
and thereby had the situation been reversed, the District of Columbia
68258 Wis. 211, 47 N.W. 2d 742 (1951) ; see also State v. Estate of Robbins,
258 Wis. 206, 47 N.W. 2d 889 (1951).
69 D.C. CODE, tit. 27, §160(e) (1940).
70 WIs. STATS. §72.01(9) 1957. The italicized language was added by amend-
ment in 1945.




would not have taxed. Thus the District of Columbia statute offered
the same protection as would a reciprocal statute.
In Ohio, there is a unique situation whereby an estate gets protection
from a multiple tax burden in three ways. Ohio Revised Code §5731.07
provides that the inheritance tax shall not apply to intangibles of a non-
resident decedent unless such intangibles were employed by him in
carrying on a business in Ohio. A presumption that intangible property
of a nonresident in Ohio is subject to the inheritance tax may be rebutted
by showing that its presence in Ohio was merely temporary, transitory
or accidental. 2 A revocable trust created by a nonresident decedent has
no business situs in Ohio sufficient to authorize Ohio to levy an inheritance
tax unless the assets of the trust were employed in some permanent busi-
ness in Ohio."a Another means to reduce the inequities of double taxation
is the credit provision of Ohio Revised Code §5731.08. If an inherit-
ance tax has been assessed and paid in another state, the beneficiaries may
offset any Ohio inheritance tax by the amount of tax paid to the other
jurisdiction provided that the amount does not exceed the Ohio inherit-
ance tax on the same property.7 4 Because of Ohio Revised Code
§5731.07, the Ohio reciprocity provisions are very rarely used. Since
Ohio must have jurisdiction of the subject matter in order for the
reciprocity provisions of the Ohio Revised Code §5731.10 to become
effective, and since very few intangibles are used "in business" in Ohio, 75
the reciprocal law of Ohio does not drastically affect revenues. 78 By
placing the principle of the Wisconsin court in Estate of Stewart v.
State, supra, beside the notion that Ohio will not tax intangibles unless
they have acquired a situs in Ohio, the Ohio reciprocity statute may be
unnecessary in such a situation.
Attempting to analyze the different reciprocal statutes by a synoptic
approach, various combinations were applied to a given situation as in-
dicated in the Comparative Reciprocal Provisions Table. Group 1 de-
notes those states that have adopted the Model Inheritance Tax Law.
Thus, a Group 1 state would not tax the intangibles of a decedent who
at the time of his death was domiciled in a state which exempts intangi-
bles of a Group 1 domiciliary either by (a) imposing no death taxes of
72 1919 OHIO Op. ATTy. GEN. 1327.
73 Estate of Parmelee, 7 Ohio Op. 455, app. dism'd., 134 Ohio St. 420 (1938).
As to taxability of shares of stock owned by a nonresident see Guaranty Trust Co.
of N.Y. v. Tax Comm., 36 Ohio App. 45, 172 N.E. 674 (1930); City Bank Farmers
Trust Co. v. Tax Comm., 480 Ohio Bar 622, 181 N.E. 877 (1932) ; 1921 OHio Op.
ATr=. GEN. 177.
74 Russell Mack, Chief of the Ohio Inheritance Tax Division, thought OHIO
REV. CODE, §5731.08, as well as the refund provision of the OHiO REV. CODE
§5731.20, should be eliminated from Ohio laws because they hampered revenue
collection and were antiquated.
75 According to Mr. Russell Mack.
76 Mr. Mack estimated that in the past five years, the Ohio reciprocal pro-
visions have involved no more than $5,000 in revenue.
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COMPARATIVE RECIPROCAL PROVISIONS TABLE
Decedent dies in state A leaving intangibles with taxable situs in state B.
DOMICILE STATE (A) NONDOMICILE STATE (B)
I. If state A exempts all intangibles (a) State B exempts all intangibles of
of non-residents and nonresidents:
A: tax B: no tax
(b) State B has reciprocal laws of
Group 1:
B: no tax
(c) State B has reciprocal laws of
Group 2:
B: may tax or
may not tax
(d) State B has reciprocal laws of
Group 3:
B: no tax
2. If state A taxes intangibles of (a) State B exempts all intangibles of
non-residents and nonresidents:
A: tax B: no tax
(b) State B has reciprocal laws of
Group 1:
B: tax
(c) State B has reciprocal laws of
Group 2:
B: tax
(d) State B has reciprocal laws of
Group 3:
B: no tax
3. If state A has reciprocal statute of (a) State B exempts all intangibles of
Group 1 and nonresidents:
A: tax B: no tax
(b) State B has reciprocal laws ot
Group 1:
B: no tax
(c) State B has reciprocal laws of
Group 2:
B: no tax
(d) State B has reciprocal laws of
Group 3:
B: no tax
4. If state A has reciprocal laws of (a) State B exempts all intangibles:
Group 2 and B: no tax
A: tax (b) State B has reciprocal laws of
Group 1:
B: no tax
(c) State B has reciprocal laws. of
Group 2:
B: no tax




DOMICILE STATE (A) NONDOMICILE STATE (B)
5. If state A has reciprocal laws of (a) State B exempts all intangibles:
Group 3 and B: no tax
A: tax (b) State B has reciprocal laws of
Group 1:
B: no tax
(c) State B has reciprocal laws of
Group 2:
B: no tax
(d) State B has reciprocal laws of
Group 3:
B: no tax
6. If state A has no death taxes (a) State B exempts all intangibles of
whatsoever (Nevada) and nonresidents:
A: no tax B: no tax
(b) State B has reciprocal laws of
Group 1:
B: no tax
(c) State B has reciprocal laws of
Group 2:
B: may tax or
may not tax
(d) State B has reciprocal laws of
Group 3:
B: no tax
any character upon the transfer of intangibles from the estate of a non-
domiciliary or (b) providing reciprocity. Group 2 denotes those states
that have adopted only paragraph (b) of the Model Inheritance Tax
Law. Consequently, the latter type state will provide exemption by
reciprocity. A Group 3 state grants reciprocity only where the state of
domicile levies an inheritance tax.
Some of the illustrations must of course be qualified; but in reducing
the statutes to categories to emphasize the possibility of double taxation
that still may exist, the table may indicate what combination is the most
satisfactory solution.
Perhaps much of the optimism of some authors favoring reciprocity7T
should be reconciled with some realism. But that statement could be
weighed against the fact that there does not appear to be much litigation
in recent years concerning reciprocity. Hence the problem may not be as
monstrous as a cold analysis of suppositions would reveal. Some states
have gone so far as to declare circumstances under which their reciprocal
7 ". . . [W]ithin a very short time we ought to have national reciprocity
throughout the forty-eight states of the Union without the help of any court. At
any rate the movement is progressing." Chairman Edwards, 1939 PROc. NATL. TAX
ASSN. 406. "Reciprocal statutes are once more the only positive bar to double or
even multiple taxation." Kappes, Double Taxation by the States-A New Tax
Hazard, 1 TAxEs 15, 1s (1940).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
statutes will operate."8 The variance in language and structure of states'
laws unnecessarily provokes confused issues. It should be noted that issues
could become more complicated where the domicile of decedent at the
time of his death is superimposed on the reciprocity laws. Even with the
enactment and use of reciprocity laws, the problem of double domicile
remains.
SOLUTIONS OTHER THAN RECIPROCITY
In the famous Dorrance case79 we saw that an estate could be taxed
by more than one state, each state claiming to be the domiciliary state.
Then the reciprocal laws of the various states were examined showing
how the states coped with multiple taxation based on double situs. Have
any other plausible solutions to avoid double taxation been afforded or
suggested?
In Florida a person may formally disclaim a state as his domicile by
filing in the office of the clerk of courts a sworn statement to the effect
that he is a "bona fide resident" of Florida.
80
In Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader8 1 the Supreme Court took
jurisdiction to decide which of two conflicting states had the proper
domicile; but three years later the Court refused to find jurisdiction in
Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley 2 holding that the Federal
Interpleader Act could not be used to settle disputes between two states,
each claiming to be the domiciliary state. Then came Texas v. Floridaz
qualifying the Riley case by permitting appeal to the United States Su-
preme Court where those states, by claiming decedent as a resident and
asserting the right to tax the entire succession on death, would consume
the entire assets of a decedent's estate. Soon after these cases, a Uniform
Act for Compromises of Death Taxes was proposed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Subsequent to
this suggestion for relief from multiple taxes, some states adopted statutes
whereby the arbitration and compromise arrangements between the con-
flicting states became possible.8 4 Today there are twenty-three states that
afford some relief of double domiciliary disputes by means of compromise
or arbitration." By means of these provisions, a taxing official of State A
enters into a written arrangement with the taxing officials of State B.
Under such an arrangement each state receives some proportionate share
of the revenue. If a compromise cannot be reached, the case goes to an
78 The Pennsylvania Secretary of Revenue on August 16, 1939, declared that
reciprocity shall extend to 35 states and territories.
79 Supra, note 12.
80 FLA. STAT. ANN. §222.17(4).
81 Supra, note 26.
82302 U.S. 292 (1937).
83 Supra, note 14.
84 For further historical setting see Comment, 30 B.U.L. REV. 396 (1950).
85 The states are listed in CCH, INH. Esr. & GiFT TAx REP. ff12,035.
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arbitration board and that board decides the issue of domicile. The
board's decision, as it pertains to death taxes, is final. One drawback to
submission to the arbitration board is that one state, by losing its claim to
domicile, will lose revenue that it might have derived by means of the
compromise arrangement. But at least the estate is not expended by
excessive taxes, as was possible under the Dorrance series of cases. Deter-
mining domicile is difficult. "A slight shift of emphasis in applying the
formula produces contradictory results.""8 The use of the term "benefit
conferring" in lieu of "domicile" has been suggested as a means of
avoiding the notion that one person can have only one domicile at a
given time."7 For those in high tax brackets, there is a comforting prin-
ciple: "It is well settled that a man may change his habitancy or domicile
from one town to another, merely because he wishes to diminish the
amount of his taxes." 88 Some states have provided means to enforce
domiciliary death tax laws.
8 9
Another solution to settle the disturbing problem of multiple taxa-
tion is the intervention of one state in the court proceedings of another
state.
90
There is some support for the idea of having the Federal Govern-
ment relinquish its estate tax to the states. Practically speaking, the
Federal Government could perhaps return more money to the states if
the United States should ever "monopolize" the death tax field. The
cost of administration could surely be reduced. But the "values associated
with the autonomy of state and local government" should not be lost;
thus perhaps the states should develop their crediting devices. 91 The
other side of the argument runs like this:
Where were the states when the banks went under? . . .
Where have the states landed in the development of their tax
systems? Then inheritance and duplicate taxation until the
Federal Government stepped in with its credit provision ...
The whole system of unfair duplicate taxation with necessary
conflicts and wasteful administration is on the road to collapse.
The problems are mostly national in scope. Nothing ef-
fective can be done in the regulation or stabilization of eco-
nomic affairs unless the area of planning and control coincides
with the boundaries of the free movement of economic life.
For many problems that area is now [1933] the nation.92
Is the system on "the road to collapse"? It seems that the states have
86 Dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Texas v. Florida, supra,
note 14, at p. 429.
87 30 B.U. L. Rav. 396, 406 (1950).
88 Draper v. Hatfield, 124 Mass. 53 (1878).
89 See CCH, INH. EST. & GiFr TAX REP. 12,030.
90 See Matter of Trowbridge, 266 N.Y. 283, 194 N.E. 756 (1935).
91 Groves, Retention of Estate and Gift Taxes by the Federal Government,
38 CALIF. L. ry. 28 (1950).
92 Prof. Gulick, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1933, p. 11, cols. 5-6.
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taken great initiative and made remarkable headway, considering the
obstacles to be hurdled.
The credit provision permitted in some states, including Ohio, has a
touch of "equity" in its approach. Ohio and Kentucky have credit pro-
visions which mitigate double taxation. The agreement between these
two states provided that "securities and deposits of nonresident decedents
which are in either state for safekeeping only, are not taxable except in
the state where decedent resided."9 3
Before the adoption of the Uniform Act for Compromise of Death
Taxes, a series of articles appeared suggesting that Congressional statutes
should confer jurisdiction upon the United States Supreme Court to
settle disputes based on conflicting domiciliary claims of the states.
94
It thus appears that a tax by one state, and only one state, has been
the favored suggestion. If states would enact legislation to the effect
that intangibles would not be subject to a death tax, and that the rate of
tax on all other property would be advanced accordingly, a movement to
convert all property into intangibles would likely be forthcoming. To
avoid this possible evasion, it is suggested that intangibles should be taxed
in the domiciliary state. To avoid confusion in determing what property
is intangible, all states should define what items will be so considered.
Perhaps the Frick rule should be expanded to include the intangible
personalty and place the situs thereof within the single state of business
situs. A study of economic principles to determine which state-domicile
or business situs-should suffer by no tax or gain by taxing would lend
to some rational conclusion. The benefit and protection doctrine which
underlies much of the basis for authorizing a state to tax would provide a
starting point. The compromise provisions which apportion to some extent
the incidents of the tax coupled with the Frick rule might also be worthy
of consideration.
CONCLUSION
Although the matter of interstate conflicts of jurisdiction to impose
death taxes on the devolution of wealth once seemed to be an insurmount-
able dilemma, "the states have now, with one or two exceptions, com-
pletely succeeded in avoiding the multiple death taxation of intangibles."
95
However, the machinery by which the states have been conquering the
double domicile and double situs dilemma could be more adequately lubri-
cated. Those states that seem to counter the thrust of another state's tax
on the former's residents by taxing their own residents again, seem to this
93 Oates, Boarder Problems in Tax A4dministration: Ohio-Kentucky, .1942
PROC. NATL. TAX AsSw. 91, 94.
94 1935 PROC. NATL. TAX AssN. 201; 1936 PROC. NATL. TAX AssN. 87; 1937
PROC. NATL. TAX ASSN. 453; 1938 PROC. NATL. TAX ASSN. 741; 1939 PROC. NATL.
TAX AssN. 407; 1940 PROC. NATL. TAX AssN. 232.
9 TAX INSTITUTE, FEDERAL-STATE-LOCAL TAX CORRELATION, 142 (1954).
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writer to be implementing the notion of "an eye for an eye." One author,
in emphasizing the "ugly aspects of state death taxation," could not agree
with the conclusion that multiple state taxation is not important because
"it is mainly at the expense of the millionaires."9 One view justifying
a tax on the devolution of property at death, claims that the accumulation
of wealth of a prosperous decedent should not be retained in the family
tree, but should be distributed to all the residents of a state; by this view
a death tax "fosters equality of opportunity.""
The states have made a forward step with their reciprocity and
compromise agreements, but much is yet to be done if multiple burdens
are to be reduced to a single burden. Perhaps the centralization approach
would offset the sapping of a single estate by the various states. A practi-
cal approach might lie in the states relinquishing their jurisdiction to the
federal government, which body could distribute the revenue to the
states in a way similar to the distribution by the state to the counties
theredf. In support of this argument, notwithstanding the administrative
advantage, is the notion that millionaires under the present system may
shift their domicile and affairs to a low taxing state or to one not levying
a death tax on any estate. In so doing the decedent deprives one state of
possible revenue and offers little or none to another. With a central
body controlling the funds, the competitive spirit of the states in luring
the decedent into a lenient taxing state might be avoided or at least
partially reduced. The federal government, by enacting the 80% tax
credit, took a movement in this direction. To what extent the states will
proceed in relinquishing their power to levy a death tax on certain prop-
erty to another state or to the United States will be an interesting develop-
ment to scrutinize; but the probabilities of such a development occurring
are weak, and justifiably so.
Death taxes are "a good potential revenue raiser which can be a
useful element in the permanent tax structure and merit special attention
at times when the [federal] government is faced with the need for large
scale spending." ' These taxes provide stability to a well organized
governmental economy, even though a single instance may demonstrate
a small proportion of state's revenue being derived from these taxes.
Should the United States Supreme Court reverse its position with regard
to the jurisdiction of states to tax intangibles, and declare that only one
state may constitutionally tax, based either on domicile or situs, we
might perceive the waning of reciprocity and the waxing of apportion-
ment and compromise statutes.
Richard L. Jackson
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')0 Groves, supra, note 91.
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